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Abstract 
 
 Decentralization has the potential to lower corruption and alleviate poverty across 
the world.1  The true effects of this process are unclear since there are relatively few 
studies on decentralization and many of these studies, both theoretical and empirical, give 
conflicting results.  One major problem in the literature for the effects of decentralization 
on corruption has been sample selection bias.  The main cross-country dataset for 
decentralization, the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS), has data for only about 
40 countries, and most of these are developed.  I attempt to mitigate this sample-selection 
problem by first estimating a Heckman model for decentralization in order to predict 
values for unobserved countries and then using these predicted values to estimate 
decentralization’s impact on corruption.  My results show that decentralization has an 
insignificant effect on corruption, suggesting that decentralization alone may not be a 
useful tool for mitigating corruption.2 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Decentralization is the process of giving local governments more fiscal, political, or administrative 
autonomy. 
2
 I would like to thank Prof. Abegaz for being my Honors Thesis Adviser as well as getting introducing me 
to the topic of decentralization by being his Research Assistant during the Summer of 2007.  I would also 
like to thank Prof. Pickering and Prof. McInerney for being on my honors committee, Casey Metheny at the 
Writing Resource Center for helping me edit my paper, and the Charles Center for awarding me a 
scholarship for the Summer of 2008 so I could start my honors research. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Overview of Decentralization, Corruption, and Economic Growth 
 Economic development has been shown to be the only way in history to save 
people from widespread poverty and discontent, as it empowers citizens economically as 
well as politically (CGD 2008 p.1).3   Unfortunately, many countries have failed to 
achieve the goal of sustained economic growth and countless people have suffered 
terribly because of it.   Seeking to explain why some countries succeed in growth and 
why some fall short, the Commission on Growth and Development lists the following 
five general characteristics of economies that have achieved high levels of sustained 
growth in the postwar period: 
  1. They fully exploited the world economy 
  2. They maintained macroeconomic stability 
  3. They mustered high rates of saving and investment 
  4. They let markets allocate resources 
  5. They had committed, credible, and capable governments  
  (CGD, 2008, p.21) 
 
 Of these characteristics, the one that can be most affected by only a few people is 
the fifth characteristic: governance.  The concept of governance encompasses how power 
is exercised and by whom.  Poor governance undermines civic and business groups, 
which can in turn lead to even worse governance as these members of civil society are ill-
equipped to provide a proper check on governments.   Because of this chain of events, it 
is no surprise that poverty and bad governance are highly correlated.  This potential 
vicious cycle makes promoting better governance a vital goal for citizens as well as the 
international community.  My interest in the fifth dimension of growth stems from these 
considerations.    
                                                 
3
 CGD: Commission on Growth and Development.  I also take economic development as a concept that 
encompasses both economic growth and structural changes in the country. 
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 Even though the quality of governance varies drastically from country to country, 
almost all political leaders say that they are committed to economic growth for their 
country.  Sometimes, leaders back up these words with effective action.  Singapore, for 
example, has made growth the centerpiece of its policies for the past 40 years.  It 
promotes high levels of savings and investment through a mandatory savings program 
called the Central Provident Fund (GCD, 2008 p. 26).  The government also spends 
almost 20% of its budget on education, which has helped the country acquire a highly 
skilled workforce (Singapore Budget 2009).  These governmental policies have 
contributed to Singapore’s average annual GDP growth rate of 7% between 1967 and 
2002 (CGD, 2008 p. 20). 
 Unfortunately, the commitment to economic growth is frequently just lip service 
and is undermined by the desire for political stability, ignorance of economic principals, 
or self-seeking interests of the people in power.  Often country leaders care more about 
political stability, which can become endangered by economic reforms that are unpopular 
in the short run.  This phenomenon is most easily seen in protectionist policies that are 
usually favored by ordinary citizens but despised by economists.  Sometimes, ignorance 
contributes to poor policy.  Robert Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe, has devastated 
his country with intense hyperinflation and food shortages due to his distaste for “bookish 
economics” (The Economist July 11th 2007).  But other times, governments hinder 
growth when politicians and bureaucrats engage in purely self-seeking behavior and use 
their position to further enhance their own wealth and power.  This practice is more 
commonly known as corruption.4   Mauro (1995) estimates that a one standard deviation 
                                                 
4
 When “corruption” is used by itself, I mean specifically “political corruption” rather than corruption in 
general which includes corruption of the private sector. 
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increase in a corruption index lowers investment by three percent and decreases annual 
GDP growth by one percent (cited in World Bank 2007). 
As for why corruption undermines economic development, one of the most well-
known costs of corruption is the creation of inefficient markets.  In such markets, 
unnecessary fees and bribes are needed to obtain government services, which often are 
received by people with more money and connections rather than the ones who need the 
services the most.  Rose-Ackerman (1999) describes corruption as “[Resulting] in an 
arbitrary and unfair pattern of payments” and “[favoring] haves and have nots…[leading] 
to less equitable income distribution” (p.3-16).  There are some theories that state a 
market based on bribes can actually be more efficient because government services are 
often provided for above or under market price, thus bribes can help the market reach 
equilibrium in some circumstances.  However, bribes rarely provide this improvement 
and often result in even more inefficiencies (Mark Philip p. 400 in Williams, 2000; Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). 
Other ways in which corruption can undermine economic growth are by 
discouraging foreign direct investment, hindering the entry of new firms into the market, 
and contributing to an uncertain business environment.  Corruption also encourages too 
much unproductive investment and under-maintenance of past investments (Rose-
Ackerman 1999).  The loss of revenue and inefficient use of government money often 
force governments to raise taxes, which is yet another way corruption can undermine 
economic growth (Oskar Kurer in Jain 2001, p.66).  Overall, one of the biggest problems 
with corruption is that it appears to be self-perpetuating, so the tolerance of corruption in 
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one agency can create a vicious cycle of corruption, spreading to other areas of the public 
sector, further exacerbating its harmful effects on development. 
The means by which corruption undermines economic growth are fairly well 
established.  The ways to prevent corruption, however, are less clear and more disputed.   
Some methods Rose-Ackerman (1999) suggests are the elimination of corruption-laden 
programs, privatization, reform of public programs, administrative reform, anticorruption 
laws, and improvement of the efficiency of government purchasing decisions.  Williams 
(2000. p.128) suggests that economic progress and the adoption of Western legal 
standards can also reduce corruption.   Finally, the writers of the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 1997 advocate increasing judicial independence and effectiveness, 
streamlining laws to make them more understandable to an ordinary citizen rather than 
just officials, strengthening citizen check groups, and dividing the government 
horizontally as well as vertically as additional means for the international community to 
help make governments across the world more honest and efficient.5   
Of these methods, one process that has not been studied in depth in the literature 
is the vertical division of the public sector, also know as decentralization.  Because this 
method has not been fully analyzed, it is unclear whether decentralization tends to reduce 
or increase corruption.  This is unfortunate since decentralization, though it is unlikely to 
be a panacea for corruption, has the potential to reduce rent-seeking behavior and thereby 
promote economic growth.  Because so many people are negatively affected by poor 
governance and underdevelopment, it is paramount that all possible tools for combating 
                                                 
5
 By vertical division I mean the division of the government and its responsibilities into multiple layers.  By 
the horizontal division of government I mean the division of one layer of government into multiple parts, 
such as with the incorporation of more towns and cities.  
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corruption are fully explored.  The rest of this paper will focus on decentralization as one 
such tool that has the potential to improve the lives of people across the world. 
 
1.2 Definitions 
In order to further analyze decentralization and its effects on political corruption, 
it is important to realize that decentralization is a multidimensional concept. Much of the 
decentralization literature divides decentralization into three categories.  Von Braun and 
Grote (2000) define the three types as follows: 
• Political (electoral) decentralization gives citizens and their local representatives more power in 
any type of decision making, including setting standards and legal frameworks. 
• Administrative decentralization re-distributes authority, responsibility and resources among 
different levels of government. Suitable capacities and institutional strength at all tiers are 
preconditions for the effectiveness of this type. 
• Fiscal decentralization entails the definition of authority over raising revenues or access to 
transfers and making decisions on current and investment expenditures (p. 3). 
 
In other words, political decentralization entails giving citizens more voting rights 
at the local level, administrative decentralization encompasses dividing the government 
bureaucracy into multiple parts, and fiscal decentralization involves giving more money 
to local governments and granting them more responsible for the government’s 
expenditures.  Because I define decentralization to be only the shifting of responsibilities 
and money within the public sector, privatization is not included in this conceptualization 
since it reflects a different type of process. Of the three dimensions, fiscal 
decentralization is the form that has been studied most frequently in the literature.  Fiscal 
decentralization is also referred to as fiscal federalism.  Fiscal federalism has received 
special attention in taxation analysis, such as the Leviathan hypothesis by Brennan and 
Buchanan (1980).  This theory states that fiscal decentralization should create 
 6 
 
competition in tax rates between localities, thereby lowering the overall size of the public 
sector.  When decentralization is applied to corruption, all three of its forms may affect 
corruption in different ways, thus they all deserve attention for possible inclusion in 
theoretical and empirical models.6 
To define political corruption, I will use Transparency International’s (TI’s) 
definition, “the abuse of public office for private gain.”  This includes various forms of 
corruption such as bribery, kickbacks, embezzlement, patronage, nepotism, and some 
forms of gift giving.  There are other definitions proposed by various scholars, but TI’s 
definition appears to capture the view of corruption that is predominant in the literature.  
Precisely defining corruption is inherently difficult because the idea of what corruption is 
has become entangled with public opinion and cultural perceptions.  The concept of what 
is “normal” government is also unclear.   As Paul Heywood (1997) states, “It would be 
impossible to develop one generalizable and uncontested definition of political 
corruption…[because] as Mark Hilip indicates…any definition of political corruption 
presupposes a notion of ‘uncorrupt’ politics.” 
Other researchers and institutions have other classifications of the types of 
corruption, but some of these categories are more concerned with different degrees of 
corruption rather than different forms.  Namibia's Zero Tolerance for Corruption 
Campaign, for example, lists petty corruption and grand corruption, the former being 
corruption on a smaller scale and the latter on a larger scale.7  Grand corruption is just a 
higher degree of corruption which would lead to a worse score from TI.  Therefore, 
decentralization should affect both petty and grand corruption.  Shleifer and Vishny 
                                                 
6
 However, as I will mention later, I do not include indicators for administrative and political 
decentralization in my model due to data constraints. 
7
 Information received from their website. 
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(1993) also provide two classifications of corruption: organized, in which where services 
are more guaranteed, and disorganized (or inefficient), in which there is uncertainty after 
a bribe is offered.  However, the idea of corruption being efficient is not very well-
founded since it is by nature secretive and undercuts information available to citizens, 
which should lead to inefficiency.  Therefore, Shleifer and Vishny’s idea of efficient 
corruption may not exist in reality. 
When discussing the specific forms of corruption, some can be analyzed together 
since they are the same in principle.  Bribery and kickbacks, for example, are effectively 
the same form.  Bribery is a citizen giving a politician money with the expectation of a 
service at that time or in the future, while a kickback is when a government official 
performs a government service for a citizen with the expectation that this person will give 
him or her money in the future.   Therefore, their only difference is when the payment is 
given to the government official.  Patronage, nepotism, and cronyism are also the same in 
practice since they all encompass awarding positions through connections rather than 
merit.   These three forms of corruption also include power preservation practices such as 
voter manipulation.   
Though some types of corruption are found specifically in the private sector, the 
corruption definition in this paper refers specifically to political corruption and does not 
include corruption that is found only within the private sector.  Decentralization should 
not directly affect corruption in the private sector since this process focuses on reform of 
the public sector.  Though these two broad forms of corruption are probably highly 
correlated, since public corruption often involves interaction with the private sector, it is 
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important to focus solely on public corruption in this paper because of decentralization’s 
more limited focus. 
 
1.3. Literature Review 
While the concepts of corruption and decentralization are fairly clear, the 
relationship between the two is theoretically ambiguous and the empirical research is still 
inconclusive.  Even though research is limited, a few case studies and cross-national 
studies have been conducted that offer some insight into the corruption-decentralization 
relationship.  In a series of case studies, Wade (1982, 1997) argues that over-
centralization is responsible for corruption in India’s irrigation bureaucracy.  Fisman and 
Gaitti (2002b) found that states in the United States with larger federal transfers were 
associated with having more government officials who were prosecuted for corruption.  
In the Philippines, decentralization was part of a 1991 reform package that included 
greater democratic representation at the lower level.  Although corruption was lower after 
these reforms, it is unclear if the improvements can necessarily be attributed to 
decentralization (Azfar and Gurgur 2000, as cited by Joaquin 2004).    
Dillinger and Webb (1999) found that decentralization in Columbia has created 
enormous fiscal problems by creating unsustainable fiscal deficits for both the national 
and subnational governments.  Decentralization has also been unable to mitigate 
corruption in the country caused by drug cartels.  While the authors believe that 
decentralization has prevented corruption from getting any worse, at the same time, it has 
been unsuccessful in solving this political problem along with many others that continue 
to plague the country, such as guerilla warfare. 
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Russia is also a good country for studying decentralization, since local 
governments became more powerful after the collapse of the USSR.  Treisman and Cai 
(2004) performed a case study on an oil company called Tatneft that was prosecuted by 
Moscow for tax evasion but was able to minimize its penalties through its connections in 
Tatarstan, its republic of origin in Russia.  In an empirical study on Russia, Freinkman 
and Plekhanov (2009) found that regions with rent-seeking governments were associated 
with grater centralization.  Although decentralization can be connected with changes in 
corruption for many case studies on this topic, there does not appear to be a specific 
country that has carried out a decentralization program with the intent of reducing 
corruption.  This limits the possible benefits that could result from analyzing 
decentralization and corruption at the national level, since the lack of an exogenous 
change in decentralization makes causal conclusions harder to draw. 
From a cross-national perspective, a consensus on decentralization’s effect on 
corruption has not yet emerged in the literature.  Some studies have found that 
decentralization was associated with lower rates of corruption.  Using simple Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients, Huther and Shah (1998) found that decentralization lowered 
corruption.  However, these unconditional correlations do not control for other variables 
that happen to be associated with decentralization.  Fisman and Gatti (2002a) also found 
that decentralization decreased corruption using OLS and a country’s legal origin as an 
instrument.  However, La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that a country’s legal origin affects a 
country’s level of corruption directly, which is an issue even Fisman and Gaitti 
acknowledge undermines the validity of their instrument.  Additionally, Arikan (2004) 
reached similar conclusions, but with much weaker results.  Arikan’s variable for 
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decentralization was significant in an OLS regression but insignificant in a 2SLS 
regression that used land mass as an instrument, thus undermining the robustness of his 
results.  Other studies which have found that decentralization decreases corruption are 
Wade (1997) and studies cited by Joaquin (2004) such as Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2001), De Dios and Ferrer (2000), and Watt et al. (1999). 
In contrast, other researchers have found decentralization to be associated with a 
higher rate of corruption.  Treisman (2000), in an empirical study that encompassed many 
other potential determinants of corruption, found that federal systems, which are typically 
more decentralized, had greater levels of corruption.  Goldsmith (1999), in a more narrow 
study, also found that federal states had higher rates of corruption.  Treisman (2002) 
found that countries with more tiers of government and smaller local jurisdictions had 
higher perceived rates of corruption in a study that included many less commonly used 
variables for measuring decentralization, such as whether a country’s constitution gives 
subnational governments the exclusive right to legislate in one policy area.  Other 
empirical studies cited in Joaquin (2004) which suggest that decentralization increases 
corruption are Doing (1999), Klitgaard et al. (2000), and Mendoza (2000). 
 
2. Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
 Before a statistical estimation can be carried out, a proper theoretical model needs 
to be developed.  First, to put such a model in the broader context of governance and 
economic development, consider the following flow charts: 
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Note: Bolder arrows indicate strengthened connections as the result of decentralization. 
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These charts are meant to portray how households and the private sector interact with two 
different levels of government.  In these general models, the governments provide public 
goods to residents and business in exchange for tax revenue.  Because citizens want their 
tax money to be spent efficiently, they hold the governments accountable when they have 
the ability to do so.  The two levels of government also monitor each other’s actions for 
possible abuse of power.  The first chart represents a more centralized economy while the 
second represents a more decentralized economy with a larger local government.   
 To illustrate the effect of decentralization, the arrows in bold in the second 
diagram represent a theorized strengthened connection as the result of decentralization.  
Initially, the decentralization process allows citizens to hold the local government more 
accountable.  Because the local governments face the incentive to be more efficient, they 
in turn provide more public goods.  In addition to the power received by the citizens, the 
local government is able to provide a better check on the national government.  This in 
turn makes the central government more efficient and prevents it from decreasing its 
output of public goods, even though less tax revenue is going to the central government 
as the result of decentralization.  Since households and business will overall receive a 
greater amount of public goods, this will in turn create greater levels of economic growth 
and development as portrayed by the larger box at the top of the diagram. 
 
2.1. A Model of Decentralization and Corruption 
 The flow charts shown above rest on the assumption that decentralization will 
create greater opportunities for citizens to hold the government accountable.  However, 
this assumption may not be true.  Heterogeneity between countries is very difficult to 
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model, so the chain of events described above in the flowcharts may apply only to a 
subset of countries.  To explore this issue in more detail, consider a model inspired by 
Arikan (2004), who shows that decentralization lowers corruption and increases the 
output of public goods using a model based on the tax competition literature.  In this 
model, Arikan (2004) uses the number of jurisdictions as an indicator of decentralization 
and assumes that each jurisdiction has the same number of residents as well as that the 
economy has perfect capital mobility.  In my model, on the other hand, I leave out capital 
entirely and use the mobility of utility-maximizing residents instead to model how 
decentralization affects corruption.  My model, like many others, represents a simplified 
world that does not completely reflect reality.  Unfortunately, I need to rely on some 
strong assumptions, such as perfect income equality as well as identical tax rates 
throughout the economy.  My model is also more reflective of developed countries, in 
which property is more marketable and mobility between jurisdictions is higher.  Because 
of this, it is unclear how easily the results of this model can be extended to developing 
countries.  Nevertheless, it should provide a useful benchmark for evaluating how 
decentralization affects corruption, which can then be elaborated upon in an empirical 
setting. 
 To set up the model, suppose that there exists a closed economy with J 
jurisdictions, each with its own corruption rate.  Let there be two types of jurisdictions, 
urban and rural.  The urban jurisdictions provide better goods and services to their 
residents, so utility is naturally higher in these localities.  h(λ) will denote a function 
representing the difference between urban and rural jurisdictions.  Each locality i has ni 
residents.  The total population of residents N is fixed, where N=∑ni   All residents have 
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an identical income I.  A jurisdiction’s tax revenue Ri comes solely from its residents and 
each family is taxed a proportion of their income at a rate T, where the tax rate is uniform 
across the economy.  From the tax revenue, a fraction D goes to the subnational 
governments and 1- D goes to the national government.  Thus, D represents the level of 
fiscal decentralization in an economy and is the key variable for this model.  From these 
variables, I derive the total tax revenue for each jurisdiction and the central government 
as follows:  
(1) Ri=niDTI 
(2) Rc=N(1-D)TI 
The i subscript represents a particular locality and the c subscript represents the central 
government.  Assume that the government is entirely self-interested and that each 
jurisdiction uses a fraction Pi of Ri for the production of public goods and a fraction 1-Pi 
for its own private benefit where 0≤Pi≤1.  Therefore, 1-Pi represents the corruption rate, a 
key variable for this model.  Let Ei be the expenditure on public goods and Ci signify 
corruption income.  These assumptions yield the following equations: 
(3) Ei=PiRi 
(4) Ec=PcRc 
(5) Ci=(1-Pi)Ri 
(6) Cc=(1-Pc)Rc 
 Next, let the production of the public goods be determined by a function f(Ei) 
such that f(1) >0 and f(2)<0, implying that allocating more money to expenditures allows 
for greater production of public goods but with diminishing marginal returns. The output 
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of the public good is divided equally between all residents, forming the amount of public 
goods per resident Zi, yielding the following equations: 
(7) Zi=f(Ei)/ni 
for subnational governments and  
(8) Zc=f(Ec)/N 
for the national government. 
 For simplicity, I assume that Zi is homogenous, where all units provide the same 
amount of utility for each residents of the economy, holding the quantity of such goods 
constant.  Finally, let each resident have a utility function that is determined by three 
factors: their consumption of public goods Zi+Zc, their after tax income (1-T)I, and 
whether they are in an urban or rural jurisdiction.  These components yield the following 
utility function: 
(9) Ui=g(Zi+Zc,(1-T)I, h(λ),) 
where the utility function Ui is concave with diminishing marginal returns.  For algebraic 
ease, I assume that ni is a continuous variable.8  I assume that residents move throughout 
the economy until their utility cannot be increased by moving into another jurisdiction.  
Therefore, in equilibrium: 
(10) Ui=Uk   ∀i,k where Ui and Uk represent the utility of residents in jurisdictions i 
and k respectively. 
The equation above implies that residents will move to another jurisdiction whenever 
their utility can increase, even if the increase is minimal.  This would happen if there is 
no cost to moving.  However, if there are restrictions on labor mobility, then these 
                                                 
8
 If ni is large this assumption should not be too restrictive.  Also, a resident can be thought of as a family 
unit where one spouse works in a different jurisdiction from the other, allowing ni to take on non-integer 
values 
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constraints should be included in the model.  To improve the model, instead of letting 
equation (10) represent true utility equality, let Ui represent a resident’s current utility 
and Uk represent the same resident’s utility if they move to a different jurisdiction k.  In 
addition, I incorporate a function L(φ) into the utility equations to capture limited labor 
mobility.  Since L(φ) encompasses the loss in utility from moving, the values of this 
function should be such that L(φ)=0 for Ui and L(φ)<0 for Uk.  L(φ) could also vary 
across jurisdictions.  For example, the cost of moving may be less in urban jurisdictions 
where residents might not own property and have fewer communal ties.  This implies that 
residents will move to different jurisdictions as long as the gain in utility from moving to 
a new jurisdiction outweighs the cost of moving there.  Therefore, the utility function 
described in (9) becomes 
(11) Ui=g(Zi+Zc,(1-T)I, h(λ), L(φ)) 
while (10) is left unchanged but now represents an equilibrium where residents move 
until the gains from moving to a different jurisdiction equal the cost endured for leaving 
their current jurisdiction. 
 From (10), the number of residents in each jurisdiction can be derived, making it 
possible to formulate an equation for the total level of corruption revenue in an economy, 
∑Ci + Cc.  Partial derivatives can be taken from this equation to calculate how the 
variables listed above affect the level of corruption in an economy.  The main variable of 
interest is D, the level of fiscal decentralization in an economy.  When D increases, 
citizens in a very corrupt jurisdiction will have more of their taxes go to the locality 
which uses their money less efficiently.   Thus, an increase in D should increase the 
incentive for these residents to move to a less corrupt jurisdiction.  This phenomenon of 
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competition between different local governments is called interjurisdictional competition 
and is a main focus of this paper.  An increase in interjurisdictional competition should 
help to lower overall corruption.   
 In addition to D, the variable J represents administrative decentralization.  When J 
increases, citizens have more opportunities to move to less corrupt localities.   To 
understand how this variable also encompasses the concept of interjurisdictional 
competition, consider a simple economy with two jurisdictions, one that is very corrupt 
and another that is not.  In this economy, not every resident would move to the less 
corrupt locality because, eventually, the less corrupt government would not be able to 
provide services more efficiently due to the production of public goods being subject to 
the law of diminishing marginal returns.  However, if another locality was created that 
had corruption levels just as low as the previously mentioned locality, then some of the 
residents from the corruption jurisdiction who did not move before could then relocate to 
this new jurisdiction for a gain in utility.9  
 The concept of interjurisdictional competition represents how decentralization can 
lower corruption.  However, 1-Pi may increase with decentralization if there is weaker 
accountability for lower levels of government.10  Since D and J represent forms of 
decentralization, the equation to represent weakened accountability is as followed: 
(12) Pi=p(D,J) where ∂Pi/∂D≤0 and ∂Pi/∂J≤0 
This function is the result of the fact that citizens may be less able to monitor corruption 
effectively in a more decentralized economy, because instead of checking on corruption 
                                                 
9
 However, due to data availability issues discussed later, hypotheses surrounding J can not be tested as 
easily, thus the rest of the model will focus of D. 
10
 The justification for why accountability may be weaker in subnational governments is discussed in more 
detail in the hypothesis section. 
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for just one level of government, citizens have to monitor the corruption of additional 
levels of government with many more jurisdictions.11  This implies that there could be 
asymmetric information in decentralization, with the governments knowing more about 
the level of corruption than their residents.  Equation (11) is reflective of this 
phenomenon.  For example, consider an increase in D and J where D0<D1 and J0<J1.  D1 
and J1 represent the characteristics of an economy after it has been more decentralized.  
From equation (12), we have P0i=p(D0,J0) and P1i=p(D1,J1).  Because of asymmetric 
information, the true decrease in Pi is not perceived.  Thus, from the perspective of the 
residents, P0i=P1i even though in reality P1i< P0i. This allows for the governments to 
decrease Pi without causing its residents to move away.   
 Finally, this setup allows for a theoretical derivation of how decentralization 
affects corruption.  Assuming the functions f(Ei) and Ui take specific forms, an analytical 
expression for ∑Ci + Cc can be formulated.  From this expression, the partial derivatives 
of D can show how fiscal decentralization effects corruption, given certain parameter 
values.   
 
2.2 Analysis with Specific Functions and Values 
 Because of these conflicting factors of interjurisdictional competition and 
weakened accountability, the sign of ∂(∑Ci + Cc)/∂D remains unclear and needs to be 
explored further.  To derive an equation for ∂(∑Ci + Cc)/∂D, consider the case where Pi 
=pi - βD - γJ, and Ui=(Zi + Zc)α((1-T)I)1-α, in which Ui is the typical Cobb-Douglas 
production function, 0≤β≤1, and 0≤γ≤1.  Let i=1 if the jurisdiction is rural and i=2 if the 
jurisdiction is urban.  Also assume that Z1=sqrt(E1+n1L1)/n1 and 
                                                 
11
 Further explanation and justification of this assumption is described in the next section 
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Z2=sqrt(E2+n2Ω+n2L2)/n2, where Ω>0.  n2Ω represent h(λ), the additional utility received 
from living in an urban locality, integrated into Z2.  n2Ω exhibits a networking effect in 
which additional residents create additional economic opportunities in the locality.12   
 In addition, n1L1 and n2L2 represent the function L(φ) for restrictions on labor 
mobility due to costs incurred from moving to different jurisdictions.  Since there are 
only two types of jurisdictions, only the residents from one type of locality will be 
moving, depending on which jurisdiction originally provides the greater level of utility 
for its residents.  Therefore, based on the nature of L(φ) as discussed earlier, L1=0 and 
L2<0 if U1 is originally greater than U2, and if U1 is originally less than U2, L1<0 and 
L2=0.  The cost of labor mobility is proportional to the number of residents to represent 
how the cost of moving would be greater if the resident was giving up a larger social 
network from his or her current jurisdiction.  For simplicity, let J be even and there be an 
equal number of rural jurisdictions as there are urban, yielding 
(13) N=(n1+n2)(J/2) ↔ n2=(2N-Jn1)/J 
where n2 is expressed in terms of n1 in order to determine the number of residents in each 
locality at equilibrium.   Next, for output from each jurisdiction, the equation is as 
follows: 
(14) Z1= sqrt((p1 - βD - γJ) DTI/n1 + L1) 
(15) Z2= sqrt((p2 - βD - γJ)DTIJ/(2N-Jn1)+Ω+L2) 
And since U1=U2 in equilibrium: 
(16) (Z1 + Zc)α((1-T)I)α-1=(Z2 + Zc)α((1-T)I)α-1 ↔ Z1=Z2 
                                                 
12
 Zi is also in this form to facilitate algebraic tractability later in the model 
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The equations above show that the differences in utility across jurisdictions are 
determined solely by the differences in Z1 and Z2.  Setting Z1 = Z2 and using (14) and (15) 
yield: 
 
(17)   sqrt((p1 - βD - γJ) DTI/n1 +L1) = sqrt((p2 - βD - γJ)DTIJ/(2N-Jn1)+Ω+L2) 
Since the number of residents in each jurisdiction at equilibrium is the current variable of 
interest, solving the above equation, (17), for n1 yields: 
(18) n1=2(p1 - βD - γJ) DTIN/(DTIJ(p1+p2- 2βD - 2γJ)+Ω+L2 –L1) 
Now that n1 is solved for, the next step is to determine the level of corruption at 
equilibrium.  The total amount of corruption income in a country, ∑Ci + Cc, is just the 
sum of corruption income from all the subnational governments plus the national 
government.  The level of corruption in the rural jurisdictions is  
(20) C1=(1-p1+βD+γJ)DTI(J(p1 - βD - γJ) DTIN/(DTIJ(p1+p2 -2βD - 2γJ)+Ω+L2-L1)) 
and corruption in the urban jurisdictions is 
(21)     C2=(1-p2+ βD+γJ)DTI(N-(J(p1 - βD - γJ) DTIN/(DTIJ(p1+p2- 2βD - 2γJ)+Ω+L2-
L1))) 
and the corruption revenue from the central government is 
(22)    Cc=(1- pc+ βD+ γJ)(1-D)TIN 
Thus, the total corruption for the economy is  
(23) ∑Ci + Cc=(1-p1+βD+γJ)DTI(J(p1 - βD - γJ) DTIN/(DTIJ(p1+p2 -2βD - 2γJ)+Ω+L2-L1 
)) + (1-p2+ βD+γJ)DTI(N-(J(p1 - βD - γJ) DTIN/(DTIJ(p1+p2- 2βD - 2γJ)+Ω+L2-L1 ))) + 
(1- pc+ βD+ γJ)(1-D)TIN 
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Finally, the above equation can be used to calculate partial derivatives and see how 
certain variables effect corruption.  Unfortunately, the variable of interest, D, has a very 
complicated partial derivative.  Assigning the following numerical values to some of the 
variables simplifies the model: 
 
N=30,000,000 (average population per country)13 
J=3,000 (number of counties in the Unites States) 
I=10,000 (World GDP/Capita) 
γ=0 (for simplification) 
T=.25 (a typical tax rate) 
Pc=.3 (for simplification) 
 
The use of these numbers yields the following partial derivative: 
∂(∑Ci +Cc)/∂D = (5.625*1017D2(((Ω+L2-L1)+L2-L1)(p2 -2p1 + βD)- (1.5*107βD2(βD-2p1) 
+ 7.5*106(p1+p2)(p1-p2)))/ ((Ω+L2-L1) + 7.5*106D(p1 + p2 – 2βD))2 
the sign of which is solely determined by the numerator.  If Ω+L2-L1 is relatively small, 
then ∂(C1 +C2 +Cc)/∂D>0 when (1.5*107βD2(βD-2p1) + 7.5*106(p1+p2)(p1-p2))<0.  The 
sign of the latter expression remains unclear.  If βD/2<p1<p2 then ∂(C1 +C2 +Cc)/∂D>0, 
but if βD/2>p1>p2 then ∂(C1 +C2 +Cc)/∂D<0.  βD/2<p1<p2 would occur if urban 
jurisdictions had a lower initial propensity for corruption than rural jurisdictions and the 
effects of weakened accountability were relatively small.   On the other hand, 
βD/2>p1>p2 would occur if rural jurisdictions had a lower initial propensity for 
                                                 
13
 These are approximate values, rounded to ease computation 
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corruption than urban jurisdictions and the effects of weakened accountability were 
relatively large. 
 In summary, the effects of fiscal decentralization on corruption remain unclear 
from a theoretical perspective.  In certain cases, increasing fiscal decentralization can be 
shown to lower corruption for an economy via interjurisdictional competition, but in 
others cases, the effects of fiscal decentralization remain ambiguous at best.  This model 
suggests that the net impact of fiscal decentralization on corruption is ultimately an 
empirical question. 
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
To put the model described above in a more qualitative perspective, 
interjurisdictional competition, which is increased by decentralization, works by 
ultimately awarding less corrupt localities with more residents and revenue.  At first, 
when the subnational share of government expenditures increases because of 
decentralization, this indicates that local governments are providing more of the 
proportion of government services to their residents.  Because of this, a citizen that 
moves between localities will see a bigger difference in the government services they 
receive than they would have under a more centralized system.  This is important because 
corrupt governments tend to provide services less efficiently, such as with bribes being 
needed for government services. Thus, if one locality is more corrupt than the other 
jurisdictions, residents will tend to move away from this corrupt locality to another one 
where their utility will be greater.  Since local governments would want more residents 
for a larger tax base, decentralization can create competition to lower corruption.   
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It is important to note that since cities and provinces are geographically closer and 
are more culturally homogenous than countries, residents cannot move between countries 
as easily.  Therefore, if a country is corrupt, many citizens cannot emigrate because of 
labor mobility restrictions due to these factors.  At the subnational level, on the other 
hand, residents can be much more mobile.  Because of this, the theory of 
interjurisdictional competition is more accurately applied to heterogeneous localities in a 
decentralized country rather than to many countries at the international level. 
The theory of interjurisdictional competition originated with Tiebout (1956), 
whose model showed that decentralization leads to greater variety in the provision of 
public goods, allowing citizens to find the jurisdiction that offers the best bundle of 
government services for themselves and causing the overall level of utility in a country to 
increase.  Since Tiebout’s paper was published, the idea of interjurisdictional competition 
has been applied to the corruption literature, where citizens are assumed to prefer less 
corrupt jurisdictions.  However, Bardhan (2002) questions how well this model can be 
applied to corruption.  Bardhan criticizes Tiebout’s model for its reliance on some 
particularly strong assumptions such as perfect mobility and information of residents, 
conditions that often do not hold, particularly for less developed countries.  In my model, 
I relax the perfect information and mobility conditions, but I still rely on other 
assumptions such as income equality.  As a result, it is left to empirical models to test 
whether or not the assumptions in Tiebout’s model, along with similar models, detract 
from their real-world predictive power (Treisman 2000; Fisman and Gatti 2002a). 
On the other hand, fiscal decentralization could also increase corruption by 
weakening accountability, as pointed out by Fisman and Gatti (2002a).   For example, it 
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may be much easier for citizens and the media to monitor one central government than 
many additional levels of government with multiple jurisdictions.  Not only does 
decentralization increase the number of entities to monitor, it could be unclear which 
level of government is corrupt if there is a diffusion of responsibilities and blame.  
Therefore, increasing decentralization may result in residents losing information on how 
corrupt the governments are, thus allowing for more corruption.  Similarly, Persson and 
Tabellini (2000) point out that national offices are often more prestigious and powerful, 
from which they hypothesize that monitoring of corruption is greater at the national level 
since the media and public may deem this level of government more worthy of attention 
(cited in Fisman and Gatti 2002a).  
The effect of weakened accountability in decentralization would most naturally be 
assessed by the number of tiers or jurisdictions of government, a measurement of 
administrative decentralization.  However, this theory can also be applied to fiscal 
decentralization.  Even if there are multiple tiers of governments, if most of the 
government services are provided by the central government, then citizens know that the 
central government is still the one to be monitored most carefully.  However, as more and 
more of government expenditures are handled by the local governments, then which tier 
to hold accountable for inefficient delivery of public services may become less clear.  
Therefore, indicators of fiscal decentralization can also be used to test the hypothesis of 
weakened accountability. 
 In addition to my two main theories of interjurisdictional competition and 
weakened accountability described previously, there are other ways decentralization can 
affect corruption.  Fiscal decentralization could lower corruption through checks and 
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balances, as proposed by Treisman (2002).  As he describes, when there are additional 
levels of government with significant responsibilities, one level may be able to monitor 
and prosecute another for corruption, particularly if doing so could be self-advantageous.  
On the other hand, fiscal decentralization could increase corruption because local 
officials may be easier to influence since they often have lower salaries and their services 
are more specialized, thus they might be easier to target.  Wolfinger (1974) emphasizes 
this point, saying that “decentralized political systems are more corruptible, because the 
potential corrupter needs to influence only a segment of the government, and because in a 
fragmented system there are fewer centralized forces and agencies to enforce honesty” 
(quoted in Treisman 2002, p.11).  Similarly, Arikan (2004) argues that the stronger 
personal links allowed by a decentralized system between government official and 
special interests may reverse any positive effects of the process.    
 In addition to fiscal decentralization, administrative decentralization also affects 
corruption but in a way that is very similar to its fiscal counterpart.  Both of these forms 
of decentralization reflect division of the government into multiple parts, thus these forms 
should have more or less the same effect on corruption.  Therefore, the same hypotheses 
used for fiscal decentralization can also be applied to administrative decentralization, 
although certain hypotheses may be more reflective of one form than the other.   The 
number of tiers of government may be a more direct way of testing the hypothesis of 
checks and balances, for example, but fiscal decentralization may show how much power 
the lower levels have to check the national government.  Similar logic can be applied to 
the other hypotheses to show how both fiscal and administrative decentralization affect 
corruption in comparable ways. 
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 Political decentralization, on the other hand, is qualitatively different from the 
other two forms since it includes additional powers for ordinary citizens rather than a 
division of government.  Therefore, it needs different hypotheses to describe how it 
affects corruption.  Political corruption could lower corruption through increased 
electoral accountability, as proposed by Treisman (2002).  In this process, if citizens 
suddenly have the power to elect non-corrupt representatives, local officials would then 
face the incentive to avoid corruption in order to preserve their jobs.  On the other hand, 
electoral decentralization could increase corruption through capture, the process of 
bureaucrats and politicians being influenced by interest groups, as first stated in The 
Federalist Papers 10 (cited in Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002).  Special interests may 
have greater personal connections and yield more power at the local level, thus they may 
be better able to manipulate a local official for their own needs.  This could cause the 
poor and minorities to be less well-protected.   In a more ethnically divided society, for 
example, the ethnic majority could use their recently gained political influence at the 
local level to take control of the subnational government and use their power to oppress 
the minority.  Bardhan and Mookherjee (2000) develop a model in which decentralization 
increases capture by elites under certain conditions.  Thus it appears from a theoretical 
perspective that political decentralization may have an ambiguous effect on corruption as 
well. 
 It is important to note that these theories describe how decentralization lowers all 
forms of public corruption rather than just one.  Interjurisdictional competition, for 
example, can impact many forms of corruption at the same time.  If citizens can leave a 
locality due to excessive bribery, they can also leave the locality if they are dissatisfied 
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with rampant patronage, embezzlement, extortion from the police, or kickbacks.  The 
only difference between these forms of corruption could be the strength of their linkage 
with decentralization.  For instance, embezzlements, extortion, and bribery may be more 
visible to residents, allowing decentralization to better lower these forms of corruption.  
However, large gift-giving and patronage may be less noticeable forms of corruption, so 
decentralization may not work as well with these facets of corruption.  Despite these 
differences, all three forms of decentralization should affect every type of political 
corruption, and since the forms of corruption are probably highly correlated, lowering a 
more visible form of corruption may also lower less noticeable forms of corruption. 
From these arguments, I formulate the following table of hypotheses concerning 
the possible theoretical connections between the various forms of decentralization and 
corruption: 
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Table 1: Linkages between Forms of Decentralization and Forms of Corruption 
Form of 
Decentralization
Fiscal & 
Administrative
Fiscal & 
Administrative
Fiscal & 
Administrative
Fiscal & 
Administrative
Electoral Electoral
          Theory
Form of 
Corruption
interjurisdictional 
competition 
checks and 
balances
weakened 
accountability
influencial local 
officials
accountibility capture
Bribery and 
Kickbacks
2 2 2 2 2 2
Graftand Gifts 1 1 1 1 1 1
Extortion and 
Robbery
2 2 2 2 2 2
Patronage, 
Nepotism, And 
Cronyism
1 1 1 1 1 1
Embezzelment 2 2 2 2 2 2
Direction of 
Relationship
Positive Positive Negative Negative Positive Negative
 
Note: A 2 indicates a strong linkage between that type of corruption and decentralization, while a 1 
indicates not as strong of a linkage. 
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From this table, the two hypotheses that will be incorporated into my working hypothesis 
will be the hypotheses of interjurisdictional competition and weakened accountability.  
These two are selected because of data usability issues, described later, and the structure 
of the theoretical model, which focuses on these two hypotheses.  Because the hypothesis 
of interjurisdictional competition states that fiscal decentralization will decrease 
corruption while the hypothesis of weakened accountability states that decentralization 
will increase corruption, I put forward that decentralization will have no overall 
significant effect on levels of corruption.   From these arguments, my main hypothesis is 
as follows: 
 
Hypothesis:  Fiscal decentralization has no significant effect on corruption because 
the corruption-reducing effect of interjurisdictional competition is nullified by the 
corruption-inducing effect of weakened accountability. 
 
2.4. Corruption Data Used for Testing Hypothesis 
To empirically test the hypothesis listed above, cross-national data will be used.  
Although some detail is lost by having such a broad perspective, cross-national analysis 
still captures the average effect decentralization has had on corruption across the world.  
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (TI’s CPI) will be the indicator 
used for measuring corruption, which is a subjective indicator composed of surveys, from 
multiple institutions, of business people and country analysts.  Michael Johnston (in Jain 
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2001) describes the CPI as the “poll of polls.”  Subjective data do have problems, such as 
possible cultural bias, not detecting changes in corruption, and measuring perceptions of 
corruption rather than corruption itself.  Illustrating the flaws of using perceptions of 
corruption, Michael Johnston (in Jain 2001) cites the hypothetical example that outside 
observers might interpret a scandal stirred up by feuding fractions as corruption when 
really it is just ethnic conflict.  Objective data, which is an alternative to subjective data, 
also has flaws in that the definition of corruption varies from country to country.  Any 
cross-national data would have to be based on these figures, thus even supposedly 
objective data would be subjective.  Because of this flaw, the data could not be compared 
across countries.  Availability, however, is the main reason for choosing to use subjective 
data because the main corruption data in the literature appears to be subjective.   
Therefore, subjective data will be used for this study (Lambsdorff 2006). 
Despite its potential drawbacks, there are many benefits of using TI’s data.  A 
minimum of three sources are required for a country to be included in the index, which 
tends to minimize possible outliers from the sample of respondents.  TI also uses inputs 
from both natives of a particular country who would tend to understate corruption as well 
as foreigners who would tend to overstate corruption.  Because of this, the corruption 
scores tend not to be biased in either direction (Lambsdorff 2006).  Johnston (2001) also 
praises the reliability of the data since it reflects various perceptions of corruption from 
thousands of individuals. However, others have cited some problems with TI’s data.  
Lambsdorff (2006) criticizes the data source for having insufficient country coverage as 
well as not picking up on changes in corruption across time.  Johnston (in Jain 2001) 
questions whether the scale used for the CPI is consistent for all values in the interval as 
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well as whether the index is biased toward measuring bribes rather than all forms of 
corruption.14   
There are a few additional publicly available measures of corruption which I have 
chosen not to use because I believe they suffer from even more problems than TI’s CPI.  
The PRS Group has created the International Country Risk Guide.  This dataset includes 
measurements of corruption going back to 1980, but it measures only the political risk 
involved with corruption rather than corruption itself.  The index represents corruption’s 
effect on political stability in a country, so a country with high levels of corruption could 
have a low score if corruption is generally tolerated in the country.  As a result, this data 
could be inappropriate for testing the hypothesis that decentralization impacts corruption 
(Lambsdorff 2006).  The World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) also has a 
corruption indicator, but the complex and somewhat vague composition of these variables 
makes it unclear if these variables actually measure the concepts the World Bank claims 
they measure.15  Overall, even though TI’s CPI does have some structural problems, it 
appears to be the best source for measuring the effects of decentralization on corruption. 
Because of the structure and reputation of TI’s CPI, the index should be 
appropriate for testing the hypotheses linking corruption and fiscal decentralization.  As 
stated earlier, decentralization should affect all forms of corruption.  Similarly, for 
weakened accountability, enlarging the bureaucracy allows some officials to extract 
bribes and kickbacks without being noticed, so participating in other forms of corruption 
may be unnoticed as well.  The surveys and responses used to compose the CPI reflect all 
these forms of corruption in a country.  Respondents are asked about their perceptions of 
                                                 
14
 As in whether a score of 9 versus 8 represents the same difference in the level of corruption as a score of 
2 versus 3 
15
 Thomas (2007) says that the WGI does not give bad data so much as incorrect data (p.31).   
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bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks, and patronage for a respective country along with 
many other questions, and these responses are then aggregated to form the Corruption 
Perception Index.  Thus, the CPI is appropriate for testing the hypotheses of 
interjurisdictional competition and weakened accountability since the index measures all 
forms of corruption with a fair degree of reliability 
 
2.5. Decentralization Data Used for Testing Hypothesis 
As for measurements of decentralization, the best indicator of fiscal 
decentralization is subnational expenditure, expressed as a percentage of total 
government expenditure, acquired from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS).  
Expenditure is better to use than subnational revenue because it more accurately reflects 
the proportion of government services that are being provided at the subnational level.  
Residents should be more concerned about how efficiently public services are being 
provided than to which level of government they pay taxes, thus the subnational 
expenditure statistics should be more appropriate for testing my hypothesis.   
Some authors, such as Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), criticize the GFS for not going 
into enough detail about subnational expenditure.  These authors cite that the IMF gives 
overall subnational expenditure as a percentage of total government revenue, pointing out 
that the decision of how this money is spent could be coming from the central 
government. For example, even if public services such as education and police protection 
are technically provided by the local governments, the national government may regulate 
how these services are provided and control the funding for them.  Therefore, the IMF’s 
revenue figures probably overstate fiscal autonomy and give an incomplete picture.  
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Fisman and Gatti (2002b) argue that expenditure decentralization without revenue 
collection responsibility can allow local officials to avoid the consequences of 
inefficiency since their revenue would be mostly unaffected by their actions.  Thus, the 
potential positive effects from decentralization may be undermined.   
 The main alternative cross-country source for fiscal decentralization comes from 
the OECD.  Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) recommend this source because it goes into more 
detail on subnational revenue.   Unfortunately, these data from the OECD only contain 
information for the 30 countries within the organization, thus the sample is not nearly as 
inclusive.   In addition, subnational revenue and expenditure have over a 97% correlation, 
so it appears that these two variables are basically the same and that expenditure 
decentralization is rarely implemented without revenue decentralization.  Thus, it appears 
that the lack of detail from the GFS may not be as detrimental in practice as others have 
suggested. 
The IMF’s data also appear to be appropriate for testing my hypothesis stating 
that the corruption-reducing effects of interjurisdictional competition will be canceled out 
by the corruption-increasing effects of weakened accountability.   The IMF’s GFS show 
what proportion of the government services are provided at a local level, so if one locality 
provides these services less efficiently because of corruption, the process of 
interjurisdictional competition should still be in effect to help lower corruption.  
Similarly, if local governments spend more of the overall government revenue, then 
which level of government to hold accountable for corruption may be less clear, making 
the subnational expenditure data useful for testing the part of my hypothesis related to 
weakened accountability as well.  The potential problem of the IMF’s data not reflecting 
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fiscal autonomy may not be problematic as long as the jurisdictions differ in their 
services and level of corruption.  For example, the central government may stipulate how 
local governments spend their money on public works projects, but even with this 
mandate, in one jurisdiction this money could be embezzled by the politicians but in 
another it could be used for its correct purpose, thus the data should still be usable for 
testing my working hypothesis.   
 Other indicators of decentralization exist, but cannot be used in my study for 
several reasons. Electoral decentralization is one such indicator, which is typically 
measured by the presence of subnational elections.  There does not appear to be any other 
competing indicators for measuring electoral decentralization.   Administrative 
decentralization, on the other hand, can be measured in multiple ways.  Usually, it is 
measured by the number of tiers or jurisdictions of government.  Other indicators of 
administrative decentralization are whether there are contiguous autonomous regions 
within a country as well as whether states or provinces have authority in taxing, spending, 
or legislating.  The variables listed above can be accessed through the database of 
political institutions.   Unfortunately, these variables cannot be used.  As I will explain 
later, the use of such variables would cause sample selection bias,16 but a Heckman 
model can not be used to predict missing values because of their discrete nature.17  As a 
result, the variables for administrative and electoral decentralization cannot be included 
in my statistical model.   This is unfortunate because decentralization is a 
multidimensional concept where all aspects interact with one another and could have 
                                                 
16
 Because these variables lack observations for many developing countries. 
17
 Since the typical Heckman models is set up with the dependent variable being continuous.   
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different impacts on corruption.  Despite this issue, I feel it is still best to exclude these 
variables in order to mitigate sample selection bias. 
 
3. Econometric Model and Results 
3.1. Econometric Issues in the Literature 
 The proper econometric estimation for testing my hypothesis that fiscal 
decentralization will have no significant effect on corruption is somewhat difficult 
because of the statistical problems surrounding the datasets for decentralization18 and 
corruption.  One is the infeasibility of panel estimation.  Previous cross-country studies 
appear to be solely cross-sectional.  There have been panel studies of decentralization at 
the subnational level such as in Fisman and Gatti (2002b), Foster and Rosenzweig 
(2001), as well as panel studies of decentralization’s effect on economic growth across 
counties as presented in Yilmaz (1999), Davoodi and Zou (1998), and Ehdaie (1994).  No 
studies, however, have used panel data, a cross-country focus, and a measurement of 
corruption as the dependent variable.  Unfortunately, it is unclear if panel estimation is 
even feasible with the current cross-country datasets on corruption.  For TI’s CPI, the 
most widely used source in the literature, a country’s score changes very little from year 
to year.  Thus, there appears to be not enough variation over time for panel analysis, 
particularly for a fixed effects model which is essentially a time-series model.  It is also 
unclear what the year-to-year changes represent in the data.  TI says the variations could 
either represent changes in the country’s level of corruption or modifications in 
methodology.   Therefore, a fixed effects model does not appear to be feasible, which is 
                                                 
18
 From here on, since my study will focus of fiscal decentralization, the use of the word “decentralization” 
by itself will be a reference to fiscal decentralization. 
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unfortunate since this type of model can correct for unobserved heterogeneity, a type of 
omitted variable bias cross-section regressions cannot account for. 
Another problem with the data used in previous studies has been sample selection 
bias.  The dataset most commonly used for measuring fiscal decentralization, the IMF’s 
GFS, contains data for roughly 40 countries, most of which are developed countries.  The 
following table summarizes the number of observations for each country in the IMF’s 
data from 1995-2006: 
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Table 2: Description of IMF’s Subnational Expenditure Data 
Country # obs. Country # obs. Country # obs. 
      
Argentina 3 Finland 9 Morocco 3 
Australia 8 France 11 Netherlands 12 
Austria 12 Germany 12 New Zealand 4 
Belgium 12 Greece 11 Norway 7 
Bolivia 5 Hungary 11 Poland 6 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1 Iceland 9 Portugal 10 
Chile 7 Ireland 12 Russia 2 
Colombia 1 Israel 7 Slovak Republic 4 
Congo 1 Italy 12 South Africa 7 
Cyprus 9 Lithuania 7 Spain 12 
Denmark 9 Luxembourg 8 Sweden 9 
El Salvador 5 Malta 4 Thailand 4 
Estonia 7 Mongolia 1 United Kingdom 9 
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For the few developing countries in the dataset, such as the Republic of Congo, data is 
sometimes available for only one year.  This structure seems to suggest that previous 
studies reflect how decentralization affects corruption in developed countries rather than 
in the entire world, which could be problematic.  Previous studies may have found that 
decentralization reduces corruption because local governments may be more competent 
and better monitored in developed countries.  In developing countries, on the other hand, 
officials in local governments may be more corruptible because bottom-up accountability 
may be lacking due to a weaker civil society and political system.  Because of this, 
decentralization may not be able to reduce corruption in these cases.   
 To overcome the lack of data in developing countries, I will first estimate a 
Heckman Selection Model with fiscal decentralization as the dependent variable.  A 
Heckman model should be used instead of OLS because countries in the IMF dataset may 
be more or less decentralized than countries not in the sample.19  For example, countries 
that are more decentralized may feel the need to have better data collection and reporting 
procedures to keep track of the level of decentralization in their country.  Because of this, 
such countries may be more likely to be included in the GFS data since the IMF has to 
rely on figures these countries provide.  Based on this model, I will then predict the 
missing values of decentralization and use these predicted values along with the actual 
values for the observed countries to estimate a model of decentralization’s effect on 
corruption.   While the use of the unaltered IMF’s data would give an accurate 
description of decentralization for the countries in the sample, this may be insufficient if 
the goal is to look at the overall effect decentralization has had across the world.  The rest 
of this paper will focus on this potential contribution to the field. 
                                                 
19
 i.e. the use of OLS here may cause sample selection bias 
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3.2. Specification and Estimation Issues 
 As previously stated, I will first estimate a Heckman regression with 
decentralization as the dependent variable to predict missing values: 
 (1) Di,t = α1 + ∑βk*xk,i,t + ρσuλ(∑γk*zk,i,t) 
where ∑βk*xk,i,t represents the main equation measuring decentralization and ∑γk*zk,i,t 
represents the selection equation for the model.  The meaning of the variables are as 
follows: Di,t represents decentralization, xk is a particular variable in the decentralization 
equation, zk is a variable in the selection equation, ρ is the correlation between the error 
term of the decentralization equation and the selection equation, σu is the standard 
deviation of the error in the selection equation, and finally λ is the inverse Mills ratio 
evaluated at country i and year t.  The data is pooled from the years 1995-2006 to create a 
natural weighting procedure for the selection mechanism.  This is important because 
developed countries have data available for most years while developing countries have 
much less coverage.  A typical cross section Heckman model would give Sweden the 
same weight as the Republic of Congo, thus giving an inaccurate description of the 
selection process. 
 From the Heckman equation, I will predict the subnational expenditure values for 
the unobserved countries, and then use these values along with the observed statistics in 
an OLS model to test my hypothesis connecting decentralization and corruption.  The 
equation to estimate is as follows: 
 (2) Ci =α2 + δ*Di +∑θk*vk,i  + εi 
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where Ci represents corruption, vk is a control variable, and Di is either the actual 
observed value of decentralization for country i or the predicted value of decentralization 
derived from (1) for an unobserved country i.  I will also run an OLS with only the 
observed data to compare the results.  Endogeneity bias could also be an issue, as Fisman 
and Gatti (2002a) suggest that corrupt officials in the central government may be against 
fiscal decentralization since it could restrict their ability to extract bribes.  Therefore, I 
will also estimate a 2SLS regression to help correct for possible endogeneity bias.  A 
2SLS regression should also correct for potential measurement error caused by using the 
predicted values of the decentralization variable instead of actual values.  In addition to 
2SLS, I will perform a bootstrapping procedure since estimates of the variance may be 
inaccurate in the OLS regression because predicted values are used rather than a random 
variable.   As for the dimensions of analysis, (2) will be measured with cross-sectional 
data rather than panel data, since TI’s CPI does not appear to have meaningful variation 
over time, as discussed earlier.  
 The most recent 2008 CPI, which includes data for 180 countries, will be used for 
equation (2).  Lambsdorff (2006) criticize older CPIs for not having data for many 
developing countries, but TI appears to have improved their data collection to cover most 
of the world, therefore this complaint seems to be no longer valid.  The explanatory 
variables will use the average values from 2002 to 2006 for each country.  Averaging 
across 5 years should mitigate year-to-year fluctuations, such as a one year drop in GDP 
from a recession which may give an inaccurate picture of the degree of economic 
development for a country.  The explanatory variables are also lagged behind the CPI 
several years to help mitigate any potential simultaneity problems.  A 2SLS regression 
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will be used to correct further for endogeneity bias in the target variable, but 
unfortunately, 2SLS cannot also correct for endogeneity problems in the control variables 
at the same time.  Using lagged values should help mitigate this problem.  In addition to 
correcting for endogeneity, lagged values are also appropriate for the general structure of 
the data, since the CPI is based on perceptions of corruption which may take several 
years to change if there is an actual change in corruption levels for a country.  Because of 
this, it is also natural to expect that the explanatory variables may take several years to 
affect the CPI.   
  
3.3. Explanatory Variables and Controls 
 In order to help reduce omitted variable bias when measuring the coefficient for 
Di, several controls are needed.  The tables below list definitions along with summary 
statistics for these variables used throughout the study: 
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Table 3: Variable Descriptions 
Name Source Definition 
   
Corruption 
Index 
Transparency 
International 
Corruption perception index (1: most corrupt) 
Subnational 
Expenditure 
IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics 
Subnational expenditure (% of total Government 
Expenditure) 
Civil Liberties Freedomhouse Index of civil liberties (1: most civil liberties) 
GDP/Capita World Bank WDI* GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 
international $) 
Government 
Expenditure 
World Bank WDI General government final consumption 
expenditure (% of GDP) 
Capital World Bank WDI Gross capital formation (% of GDP) 
Imports World Bank WDI Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Population World Bank WDI Total population 
Area World Bank WDI Land area (sq. km) 
Urban World Bank WDI Urban population (% of total) 
English La Porta et al. (1999) 1: English common law legal origin 
French La Porta et al. (1999) 1: French commercial code legal origin 
Federal Forum of Federations 1: Federal system of government 
 *WD1: World Development Indicators 
Table 4: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Corruption Index 180 4.02 2.11 1 9.3 
Sub. Expenditure 283 0.278 0.151 0.0122 0.641 
Log GDP/Capita 2758 8.47 1.3 4.92 11.2 
Log Area 3248 11.1 2.85 0.668 16.6 
Log Population 3133 15.4 2.12 9.89 21.1 
Gov. Expenditure 2614 16.2 6.6 2.86 69.5 
Civil Liberties 3192 3.54 1.86 1 7 
Imports 2745 45.8 22.2 1.05 100 
Urban 3232 54.3 24.4 6.56 100 
Capital 2642 22.9 8.73 -23.8 100 
English 3120 0.333 0.471 0 1 
French 3120 0.436 0.496 0 1 
Federal 3248 0.113 0.317 0 1 
      
Rounded to 3 significant figures, except for observations  
Years used in the summary statistics are 1992-2007, except for the Corruption Index which is for 2008 
Observations above 100 for Imports and Capital were truncated at 100, since values above 100 are 
impossible and due to measurement error 
Log=Natural Log, used to mitigate the effects of influential observations 
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In regards to financial variables, GDP per capita is an important control because 
developed economies are better able to monitor corruption.  In addition, Treisman (2000) 
notes that higher levels of economic development are associated with greater levels of 
democracy, education, literacy, and depersonalized relationships, factors that should also 
help to mitigate corruption.  In addition to economic development, openness with the rest 
of the world should help lower corruption because countries that compete in the global 
market are less competitive if foreign investors have to pay bribes to do business, as 
noted by Ades and Di Tella (1996, 1999 cited in Treisman 2000).   A proxy for openness 
used by Treisman (2000) is imports as a percentage of GDP, so this variable will also be 
used in my study.  The relative public sector size in the economy may also influence 
corruption because the larger the degree of government involvement and interference in 
the economy, the greater the extent the government has power to extract bribes (Tanzi 
1994, cited in Treisman 2000).  
 As for demographic and political control variables, Fisman and Gatti (2002a) use 
an index of civil liberties as a control in their study since this variable captures the extent 
to which citizens, the press, and other aspects of civil society are strong enough to check 
against possibly corrupt governments.  A control variable for the percentage of the 
population that is urban should also be included because more metropolitan societies may 
be better equipped to monitor and resist corruption.  The structure of the legal system 
may also be influential.  La Porta et al. (1999) argue that countries with a common law 
legal system evolved from England, where the legal system developed to protect property 
owners from the state, while non-common law systems grew as more of an instrument of 
the state.  Because legal systems that protect property owners may also protect ordinary 
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citizens from corruption, a country’s legal system could be a determinant of corruption, 
so dummies for these two types of legal systems will be used. 
 Finally, Treisman (2000) uses a dummy variable for whether a country is federal, 
since this author considers federalism a form of decentralization and justifies his 
federalism variable with theories regarding decentralization listed earlier in this paper.  I 
do not include federalism as one of my target variables, although I do include it as a 
control.  Federalism is not a main focus of my study because I consider it as encouraging 
decentralization rather than as a form of decentralization in itself, since federalism is just 
the general blueprint for the structure of government stated in a country’s constitution, 
rather than a true depiction of the structure of a country.  Even though a country may be 
technically federal, it is possible that this government structure is more of a formality, 
and, in practice, the central government is the body that holds most of the governmental 
power.  Even though I do not consider federalism to be one of my variables of interests, I 
do include it as a control since other researchers have found that federalism may have 
some effect on corruption.  
 In addition to the variables listed above that determine corruption, the 
determinants of decentralization also need discussion.  When specifying which variables 
belong in equation (1) for the decentralization equation, federal countries should naturally 
have higher levels of fiscal decentralization since federalism creates a formal system in 
which lower levels of government can demand money and fiscal autonomy.  A larger 
country, in both land area and population, should have more diverse regions and peoples, 
so the demand for fiscal decentralization should be greater in such states.  GDP per capita 
could also have a positive effect on decentralization, since greater economic activity is 
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often associated with more diversity in the private sector.   Because of this, 
decentralization may be needed so that varying businesses and industries can find a 
subnational government that best tailors to their needs.  Trade could also be a factor since 
international openness encourages central governments to be smaller and more attractive 
to international investors, but this attitude may not necessarily trickle down to the lower 
levels of governments.  Citizens in a country with more civil liberties may demand more 
diversified public goods, causing fiscal decentralization to be higher in such countries.  
Finally, government size may be influential since decentralization could be greater in 
more evolved public sectors (Garret and Rodden 2001).   
 For modeling the selection process in equation (1), variables for GDP per capita, 
civil liberties, and imports should be included because countries that are more developed 
should be more likely to be present in the model.  Countries that are more likely to be 
decentralized should also be more likely to be in the sample, so the variables for 
federalism, population size, and land area need to be included.  So far, all the variables 
listed above for the selection equation are also found in the main decentralization 
equation.  This would be insufficient, since at least one identifying variable is needed in 
the selection equation for Heckman models.  An identifying variable I propose is gross 
capital formation as a percentage of GDP.  Middle income countries typically have a 
higher value for this variable, and since these countries should be underrepresented in the 
IMF’s dataset, this variable may be negatively correlated with selection.  However, 
underdeveloped countries, which also less frequently appear in the dataset, should have 
lower expenditure on capital as a percentage of GDP.  I put forward that for countries not 
in the sample, middle income countries should overall outnumber low income countries 
 47 
 
and thus there should still be a negative correlation, but whether this is true remains to be 
empirically tested. 
 There are other potential explanatory variables that previous researchers have 
used to model corruption which I have excluded from this study.  Freedomhouse also has 
an index of political freedoms along with their index of civil liberties, but these two 
variables have over an 80% correlation, so it appears that they are mostly the same 
indicator and the use of both could result in multicollinearity problems.  La Porta et al. 
(1999) use an ethnic diversity index in their study of corruption, arguing that in ethnically 
divided countries, the group in power may use its position to oppress the other groups via 
corruption.  However, the number of observations is low and the index is based mostly on 
studies from the 1960’s, so it is unclear whether this variable would even reflect current 
ethnic diversity in a country.  Measurements of income inequality could also be relevant, 
but the GINI index from the UN Human Development Report cannot be precisely 
compared across countries because one uniform survey was not used for all countries. 
 Other control variables that could be included are indices of democracy, years of 
uninterrupted democracy (Treisman 2000), indicators of education such as literacy rates 
(La Porta et al. 1999), GDP coming from exports of natural resources (Treisman 2000), 
average public sector wages (La Porta et al. 1999), and religious demographic 
information (Treisman 2000).   Unfortunately, these variables suffer from sample 
selection problems as well, with missing data for many developing countries.  The use of 
such variables might nullify the reduction in sample selection bias from the use of the 
Heckman equation for decentralization.   Equations could be specified to predict missing 
values for these control variables as well, but since this procedure is inferior to actual 
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data, having multiple variables with Heckman predictions could exacerbate measurement 
error issues, and an IV regression cannot be run on multiple variables simultaneously to 
correct for potential measurement error bias.  Also, other control variables that I do 
include could be proxies for these variables.  The civil liberties variables, for example, 
could also measure the strength of democracy and years of uninterrupted democracy.  A 
more economically developed country should have higher literacy rates as well.   By the 
arguments listed above, I exclude these variables with the mindset that even with the risk 
of potential omitted variable bias, the inclusion of such variables would do more harm 
than good. 
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3.4. Results 
 
 
Table 5: Heckman Selection Equation Results (Equation 1) 
Dependent Variable: Subnational Expenditure (D) 
  
Main Equation 
Selection 
Equation 
   
Log Area 0.038*** 0.006*** 
 (6.81) (3.43) 
Federal 0.172*** -0.016*** 
 (14.01) (-3.84) 
Civil Liberties -0.019*** 0.005*** 
 (-5.38) (3.52) 
Imports 0.002*** 0.001*** 
 (3.56) (4.34) 
Gov. Expenditure 0.012*** 0.001* 
 (6.75) (1.85) 
Log GDP/Capita  0.052*** 
  (8.63) 
Log Population  0.008*** 
  (3.54) 
Capital  -0.002*** 
  (-3.29) 
Constant -0.365***  
 (-3.88)  
Athrho -0.594***  
 (-4.95)  
Lnsigma -2.214***  
 (-33.86)  
Number 
Observations 
2499  
   
Marginal effects; t statistics in parentheses  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Full Information Maximum Likelihood and 
Robust standard errors used  
Coefficient for selection equation listed as marginal effects, 
derived from a separate probit estimation 
Years used in sample are 1992 through 2007 
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Table 5 shown above lists the results of the Heckman equation (Equation (1)).  In the first 
iteration not shown above, the variable on capital expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
was significant and negative in the selection equation, suggesting the overall Heckman 
model was originally properly identified as well as supporting the original conjecture that 
more capital intensive countries would be underrepresented in the sample.  Also in the 
first iteration, the GDP/capita and population variables were insignificant as a group in 
the decentralization equation.  Because of this, these variables were dropped from the 
decentralization equation to improve the identification of the model, leading to the results 
listed in Table 5.  Of the significant variables in the decentralization equation, all had 
their anticipated signs.20  For the selection equation, countries that were federal and had 
greater civil liberties were surprisingly less likely to be in the sample, suggesting that the 
IMF’s data under-represents such countries.  Interestingly, rho was negative.  The 
standard interpretation of rho implies that countries that are more likely to be in the 
sample are less decentralized.  However, countries present in the sample are typically 
developed countries which tend to have characteristics that are associated with higher 
rates of decentralization, such as greater civil liberties and openness with the global 
economy.   Also, several of the variables that increased the probability of selection were 
also associated with higher rates of decentralization.  As a result, the reason for the 
negative rho remains unclear.21 
 
 
                                                 
20
 To avoid any confusion, for the civil liberties variable, since lower values indicate higher civil liberties, a 
negative coefficient implies that greater civil liberties increases decentralization 
21
 This contradiction could suggests that the usual explanation of rho might not be valid, and instead the rho 
is just the correlation between the unobserved variables in the main equation and the unobserved variables 
in the selection equation, whatever these variables may be. 
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Table 6: OLS Results (Equation 2)  
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Method OLS OLS OLS 2SLS, 2SLS, OLS, 
    1st stage 2nd stage Bootstrap 
Dependent Variable Corruption Corruption Corruption Sub. Exp. Corruption Corruption 
       
Sub. Expenditure 1.850      
(Actual values) (0.87)      
Sub. Expenditure  -2.369 -0.557  -1.583  -0.690 
(Predicted + Actual)  (-1.57) (-0.54)  (-1.05)  (-0.76) 
Log GDP/Capita 1.867*** 1.064*** 1.147*** 0.006 1.145*** 1.147*** 
 (6.03) (6.69) (12.69) (1.06) (12.50) (9.65) 
Gov. Expenditure 0.057 0.082*** 0.062*** 0.011*** 0.072*** 0.062*** 
 (1.14) (3.47) (3.12) (9.34) (3.27) (2.80) 
Log Area    0.034***   
    (7.79)   
Log Population    0.003   
    (0.45)   
Civil Liberties -0.034 -0.082     
 (-0.23) (-1.24)     
Imports 0.005 0.001     
 (0.46) (0.24)     
Urban 0.016 0.003     
 (0.88) (0.30)     
English 0.069 0.315     
 (0.13) (1.04)     
French 0.033 0.318     
 (0.06) (1.21)     
Federal -0.856 0.822     
 (-1.43) (1.56)     
Constant -14.772*** -5.944*** -6.587*** -0.393*** -6.438*** -6.537*** 
 (-7.21) (-5.06) (-8.89) (-4.83) (-8.36) (-6.13) 
N 37 156 161 161 161 161 
       
t statistics in parentheses       
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01      
Robust standard errors used for all regression except 5     
The average value from 2002 to 2006 for each country is taken of the explanatory variables    
For Bootstrap: 1000 replications from both equations, Heckman iterations limited to 100   
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 The table above shows the regression results for the various iterations of equation 
(2) which test my hypothesis.   Column (1) uses only the actual values of decentralization 
while column (2) includes these numbers along with the predicted values for missing 
countries.22  The actual values were moderately similar to the predicted values for the 
countries present in the IMF data.  Using the mean of subnational expenditure from 2002 
to 2006 for each country, the average for the absolute value of the difference between the 
actual and predicted values was approximately 0.11, with a slightly greater discrepancy 
for less developed countries.  Overall, these two regressions are fairly similar.  In both 
iterations, decentralization is insignificant and the log of GDP per capita is the only 
highly significant variable, suggesting that sample selection bias may not be as much of a 
problem as originally anticipated.  Nevertheless, even if the coefficients do not vary 
much between samples, the use of predicted values allows for a much larger sample size, 
thus providing for more accurate estimates of these coefficients.  Even with a larger 
sample size, many of the control variables were insignificant.  An F-test showed that the 
insignificant variables in column (2) were insignificant as a group as well.  The exclusion 
of these variables led to the third regression which has only three variables: subnational 
expenditure, log of GDP per capita, and government expenditure as a percentage of GDP.   
Government expenditure had a different sign than originally anticipated, possibly because 
countries with larger public sectors also have more evolved and sophisticated 
bureaucracies which have checks in place to stop potential corruption.  
                                                 
22
 I also ran separate regressions for developed and non-developed countries using data from both 
regression 1 and 2.  This did not change the results, suggesting that the effects of decentralization is 
uniform between both groups of countries 
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 To correct for possible endogeneity and measurement error biases, a 2SLS 
regression is needed.23   In order to ensure the equation is properly specified, at least one 
identifying variable is required.  Two identifying variables I propose are population size 
and land mass, both taken in natural log form.  As discussed earlier, the larger a country 
is in both land mass and population, the more diverse the country tends to be.  Thus, 
decentralization may be needed to have public goods tailored to various subpopulations.  
These two variables, however, should have no effect on corruption.   The majority of the 
literature does not include these two variables as explanatory variables for corruption, 
and Arikan (2004) even uses land mass as his identifying variable for estimating 
decentralization’s effect on corruption.  However, Fisman and Gatti (2002a) do include 
population size as a control variable, arguing, “if large countries exploit economies of 
scale in the provision of public services (Ades and Wacziarg, 1997), and therefore have a 
low ratio of public service outlets per capita, individuals might revert to bribes ‘to get 
ahead of the queue’” (p. 330).  Since this argument could be applied to countries that are 
larger in respect to land mass as well, it may seem that both population and land mass are 
determinants of corruption.  But Fisman and Gatti’s argument seems questionable.   Even 
if larger countries provide less public goods per capita, this may come about because they 
are more efficient at providing these public goods, so their citizens should be no worse 
off.  Therefore, I do not include population and land mass as explanatory variables for 
corruption and instead use them as identifying variables for a 2SLS regression.  
 Estimation of the 2SLS regression yielded results that were surprisingly similar to 
the OLS results.  A test for over-identifying restrictions showed that the identifying 
variables were not significant as a group in the main equation and a test for weak 
                                                 
23
 Discussion of these two problems was listed on page 41. 
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instrumental variables showed the identifying variables as being highly significant in the 
underlying equation for the determinants of decentralization.  These two tests suggest that 
the 2SLS model is properly specified.  A Hausman test did show that the 2SLS and OLS 
were significantly different, perhaps suggesting that the OLS results are inconsistent.  
However, the test was barley significant at the 10% level with a p-value of 0.0945.  In 
addition, the test seemed to have been unduly influenced by the difference in the 
subnational expenditure coefficient, which was insignificant in both regressions.  This 
suggests that simultaneity bias was not a problem in the OLS regressions, even though 
the Hausman test was significant.  In addition to the 2SLS results, a bootstrap estimation 
did not significantly change the variance and significance of the variables in the model, 
suggesting that the use of predicted values does not significantly alter the structure of the 
variance-covariance matrix for equation (1). 
 Overall, the main determinant of corruption appears to be GDP per capita.  Since 
this variable is in semi-log form, the coefficient of 1.147 implies that a 1% increase in 
GDP per capita leads to over a 1 point increase in the CPI.  Since this index only ranges 
between 0 and 10, the magnitude of this coefficient is extremely large.   Besides general 
government expenditure, none of the other potential determinants of corruption seemed to 
have any effect, including the decentralization variable.  The results appear to support the 
original hypothesis that decentralization will have no significant effect on corruption due 
to the interaction of the corruption-reducing effects from interjurisdictional competition 
and the corruption-inducing effects of weakened accountability.  However, since my 
theoretical model is more reflective of developed countries, it is unclear if my conclusion 
can be extended to all countries in the world or just developed countries. 
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4. Conclusion 
 This study suggests that decentralization does not significantly affect a country’s 
overall level of corruption.  Decentralization has the potential to reduce corruption by 
creating competition between governments, but my study implies that these benefits are 
undercut by decentralization’s tendency to decrease accountability.  This outcome is 
different from some other studies such as Fisman and Gatti (2002a) which showed 
decentralization lowering corruption.  Even though the Heckman model helps to reduce 
sample selection bias, it does not eliminate it entirely since the predicted values are 
inferior to actual data.  However, the insignificant differences between the OLS and 
2SLS estimations suggest that the fiscal decentralization variable does not suffer from 
bias due to measurement error, so resorting to predicted figures may not be too 
problematic. 
 In addition to data availability problems, the exclusion of variables for 
administrative and political decentralization from my study may also be problematic.  
Decentralization is a multidimensional concept, so the exclusion of these variables leaves 
out how the three forms of decentralization interact with one another and affect 
decentralization in different ways.   For example, fiscal decentralization may have no 
effect on corruption if citizens do not have political rights at the local level.  While the 
exclusion of these variables is problematic, I felt it was best to exclude them in order to 
use a Heckman model to predict missing values and alleviate sample selection bias, 
which has not been tried before in the literature.   I also attempted to account for political 
rights at the local level by including other control variables such as the index of civil 
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liberties from Freedomhouse.24  Nevertheless, the exclusion of political and 
administrative decentralization variables gives an incomplete picture of fiscal 
decentralization’s effect on corruption, an issue that should be explored in future 
research.   Most of the previous studies of decentralization have also not accounted for 
political decentralization, so even with sample selection issues, the use of a political 
decentralization variables in future research could provide useful insight.  Ideally, more 
complete data on subnational elections as well as some sort of local democracy score, 
such as the one created by Freedomhouse for post-Soviets states, could be used, but 
unfortunately, such data do not exist. 
 Studying fiscal decentralization from a cross-country perspective also gives an 
incomplete picture of its effects on corruption.  Devolving power and money to 
subnational governments is often carried out differently from country to country, and 
some governments may handle decentralization better than others.  Accountability in 
lowers level of government could be much weaker in developing countries, for example, 
so decentralization may be less effective or even detrimental in such states.  
 Unfortunately, cross-country datasets cannot capture these idiosyncrasies.  As a 
result, cross-country studies may not be able to provide enough detail to analyze 
completely the relationship between decentralization and corruption.  Despite these 
problems, empirical cross-country analysis can provide a unique perspective to see if 
decentralization has had an overall effect in reducing corruption across the world.  It is 
still an open question as to whether this process is a useful tool for reducing corruption.  
Since there are relatively few studies on decentralization and corruption, more research, 
                                                 
24
 I do acknowledge that even though this variable does account for political rights, it is not a great 
indicator for the strength of civil society at the local level. 
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particularly studies on a subnational level for less frequently analyzed countries, should 
be performed in order to obtain a more accurate perspective of decentralization’s effect 
on corruption.  
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5. Appendix 
Table 7: Countries Present in the Sample for Equation 225 
Albania Dominican Republic Latvia Romania 
Algeria Ecuador Lebanon Russian Federation 
Argentina Egypt, Arab Rep. Lesotho Rwanda 
Armenia El Salvador Liberia Saudi Arabia 
Australia Equatorial Guinea Libya Senegal 
Austria Eritrea Lithuania Serbia 
Azerbaijan Estonia Luxembourg Seychelles 
Bahrain Ethiopia Macao, China Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh Finland Macedonia, FYR Singapore 
Belarus France Madagascar Slovak Republic 
Belgium Gabon Malawi Slovenia 
Belize Gambia, The Malaysia South Africa 
Benin Georgia Maldives Spain 
Bhutan Germany Mali Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Ghana Malta St. Lucia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Greece Mauritania St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Botswana Guatemala Mauritius Sudan 
Brazil Guinea Mexico Suriname 
Bulgaria Guinea-Bissau Moldova Swaziland 
Burkina Faso Guyana Mongolia Sweden 
Burundi Haiti Montenegro Switzerland 
Cambodia Honduras Morocco Syrian Arab Republic 
Cameroon Hong Kong, China Mozambique Tajikistan 
Canada Hungary Namibia Thailand 
Cape Verde Iceland Nepal Togo 
Central African Republic India Netherlands Tonga 
Chad Indonesia New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago 
Chile Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua Tunisia 
China Ireland Niger Turkey 
Colombia Israel Norway Uganda 
Comoros Italy Oman Ukraine 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Pakistan United Arab Emirates 
Congo, Rep. Japan Panama United Kingdom 
Costa Rica Jordan Papua New Guinea United States 
Cote d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Paraguay Uruguay 
Croatia Kenya Peru Uzbekistan 
Czech Republic Korea, Rep. Philippines Vanuatu 
Denmark Kuwait Poland Venezuela, RB 
Djibouti Kyrgyz Republic Portugal Vietnam 
Dominica Lao PDR Qatar Yemen, Rep. 
   Zambia 
 
                                                 
25
 By “present in the sample for equation 2”  I mean the 161 countries present in columns 3 through 6 of 
Table 6 
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